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Abstract: There are often “gains from sharing” underutilized goods with others.  People routinely 
share tools, media, gear, electronics, toys, space, and vehicles with relatives, friends, and neighbors, 
and the internet is opening up new opportunities to share them with strangers.  Drawing on the 
work of James Buchanan, Elinor Ostrom, and Yochai Benkler, I develop an economic framework of 
decentralized sharing.  My analysis challenges the implications of simple economic models, which 
ignore the role of sticky norms and endogenous preferences and, therefore, suggest that people are 
always sharing at efficient levels.  I argue that the online platforms may gradually transform norms 
and preferences to substantially increase peer-to-peer borrowing and lending.  Using data from 
General Social Survey, the Consumer Expenditure Survey, the online platform NeighborGoods, and 
my own survey, I estimate the current and potential value of decentralized sharing.  I find that 
today peer-to-peer borrowing is worth at least $179 a year for 30 percent of Americans and at least 
$774 for 8 percent of Americans.  If the online platforms are able to facilitate high levels of sharing 
among loosely-tied individuals, the annual benefit to the average household would be modest but 
significant, perhaps one thousand dollars a year.  My analysis suggests that that there are significant 
gains from sharing tools, media, gear, electronics, toys, pets, vacation homes, and lodging, but the 
largest gains will likely come from sharing privately-owned vehicles. 
Keywords: theory of clubs, theory of households, excludable non-rival goods, decentralized 
cooperation, reciprocity 
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1. Introduction 
There are “gains from sharing” goods when the cost to the lender is less than the benefit to the 
borrower.  Relatives, friends, and neighbors have historically shared tools, media, gear, electronics, 
toys, space, and vehicles, and the internet is reducing the transaction costs of decentralized 
borrowing and lending among strangers.  The websites Couchsurfing, NeighborGoods, Sharetribe, 
and Spotwag provide platforms for people to share goods for free; Airbnb and RelayRides provide 
new rental markets for people to share lodging and vehicles. 
The “sharing economy” has received considerable attention in the mass media, from Rachel 
Botsman’s TED talk on “The Case for Collaborative Consumption”, to The Economist’s March 2013 
cover story, to Thomas Friedman’s July 20th, 2013 op-ed in the New York Times, “Welcome to the 
Sharing Economy”.  Researchers are beginning to address the sharing economy as well, and 
Agyeman, McLaren, and Schaeffer-Borrego (2013) provide a useful review of much of that work.  
However, economists have largely ignored the issue, perhaps because data on sharing is scarce, 
perhaps because simple models suggest individuals will always share at efficient levels, and 
perhaps because notions of limitless economic growth reduced interest in economizing on goods.  
That is all changing.  Online sharing platforms provide new sources of data.  Sticky norms and 
endogenous preferences can lead to inefficient and unstable equilibria.  And slow economic growth 
and heightened concerns over climate change have spurred new interest in economizing on goods. 
 I begin my analysis of the economics of sharing by reviewing the literature on club goods, 
household economies, community governance, and decentralized cooperation.  James Buchanan’s 
theory of clubs highlights the prevalence of shareable goods, but simple neoclassical models naively 
suggest that markets will lead individuals to automatically exploit all gains from sharing.  Elinor 
Ostrom explores how communities can efficiently manage common goods, but community 
governance is not an effective means of sharing privately-owned goods.  Yochai Benkler celebrates 
the power of decentralized sharing, but his enthusiasm warrants a careful economic analysis of the 
current and potential gains from sharing. 
 After reviewing the literature, I present a framework for understanding peer-to-peer 
sharing.  The economic benefits from sharing stem from the underutilization of private goods.  The 
costs of sharing are influenced by technology, norms, and preferences.  Although online platforms 
greatly reduce the cost of matching people with goods, our norms and preferences have not fully 
adjusted to this technological change.  Over time, I argue that online networks will develop norms 
conducive to peer-to-peer sharing and promote preferences for this form of cooperation.  The 
evolution of our sticky norms and endogenous preferences could lead to a substantial increase in 
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sharing in the years to come.  My benefit and cost framework also explains why people share 
different kinds of goods using different institutions, including libraries, second-hand markets, and 
online platforms.  I argue that further gains from sharing will likely come from institutions that 
facilitate peer-to-peer borrowing and lending. 
Next, I describe my data and methodology for estimating the current value and potential 
value of decentralized sharing.  I use data from the General Social Survey, the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey, the NeighborGoods network, and my online survey.  I estimate current gains 
from sharing by assigning a value to how often people report borrowing and lending items.  I 
estimate an upper-bound of the potential gains from sharing by calculating household expenditures 
on a variety of shareable goods.  Although my methods cannot measure the social costs and benefits 
of sharing, they shed light on the magnitude of private benefits. 
My results suggest that decentralized sharing is currently worth at least $179 dollars a year 
to the 30 percent of Americans who borrow an item once a month or more.  If new online platforms 
succeed in fostering substantial borrowing and lending among strangers, the mean household gains 
from sharing could exceed one thousand dollars annually.  Significant gains are most likely to come 
from sharing tools, media, gear, electronics, toys, pets, vacation homes, and lodging on online 
platforms.  Households may save the most by effectively sharing privately-owned vehicles. 
 
2. Literature review 
My review of the literature begins within neoclassical economics.  Although some researchers 
criticize the rationalist, self-interested approaches to understanding sharing (see Belk 2010), I 
make the case that decentralized sharing may become increasingly important for rational, 
economic actors.  Buchanan and Salcedo et al. present models of clubs and households, which 
suggest that people always share at efficient levels.   However, their models ignore how norms and 
preferences determine the costs of sharing, which weakens their argument that equilibria levels of 
sharing are efficient or stable.  Ostrom argues that individuals may squander common goods, and 
that communities can govern such goods efficiently.  However, the principles for community 
governance are not met in the case of shareable goods.  I draw heavily on Benkler’s arguments that 
decentralized sharing among loosely-connected individuals is viable, pervasive, and increasingly 
important.  Benkler draws on Coase’s work on transaction costs, but he overlooks the relevance of 
Akerlof’s work on how asymmetric information can lead to adverse selection.  My theoretical and 
empirical sections build on Benkler’s analysis, while tempering his enthusiasm. 
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 Buchanan’s groundbreaking 1965 paper, “An Economic Theory of Clubs”, highlights the 
pervasiveness of goods that are neither “purely private” nor “purely public” (Buchanan 1965, 1). 
 
“As an extreme example, take a good normally considered to be purely private, say, 
a pair of shoes.  Clearly your own utility from a single pair of shoes, per unit of time, 
depends on the number of other persons who share them with you.  Simultaneous 
physical sharing may not, of course, be possible; only one person can wear the shoes 
at each particular moment.  However, for any finite period of time, sharing is 
possible, even for such evidently private goods.” (Buchanan 1965, 3) 
 
Buchanan ultimately focuses on goods that are commonly shared through clubs, such as golf 
courses, but his analysis also applies to what I call shareable goods.  Like club goods, shareable 
goods are excludable and fairly non-rival, since people can take turns using them. 
 
Table 1. Taxonomy of Goods 
 Excludable Non-excludable 
Rival private goods common goods 
Non-Rival club goods, shareable goods public goods 
 
 Buchanan assumes that clubs accept new members until the benefit of sharing the expense 
with the marginal member is offset by the cost of sharing the good with the marginal member 
(Buchanan 1965, 5).  The cost of sharing can be negative in some domains, due to camaraderie 
(Sandler and Tschirhardt 1980).  However, in equilibrium it must cost current members something 
to share the good with an additional member.  (If it did not, a profit-maximizing club would admit 
an additional member without reducing the fees paid by current members.)  The model suggests 
that the market will guide individuals to share some goods efficiently through clubs.  It is fairly 
straight-forward to generalize Buchanan’s idea to peer-to-peer renting.  Rational owners should 
rent underutilized goods to their peers whenever the benefit to the borrower – measured in dollars 
– exceeds the cost to the lender.  From this perspective, the lack of peer-to-peer renting suggests 
that gains from sharing are rare. 
Alejandrina Salcedo, Todd Schoellman, and Michèle Tertilt’s 2013 paper “Families as 
Roommates” makes no reference to Buchanan, but it essentially describes households as clubs.  In 
their model, people live together if the benefit of splitting the expense of household public goods 
outweighs the time cost of “forming and maintaining relationships” with each of their housemates.  
(Without such a cost, utility-maximizing individuals would all live in a single, humungous 
household.)  Salcedo et al. calibrate their model to fit current data from the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (CES), which shows that people with higher incomes tend to live in smaller households and 
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spend a smaller proportion of their incomes on household public goods.  Their calibrated model is 
consistent with established household equivalency scales.  For example, it suggests that the 
household with two median-income adults is 12 percent better off than their single peers earning 
the same per-capita income. 
Buchanan’s theory of clubs and Salcedo et al.’s theory of households assume that individuals 
share goods when the benefits outweigh the costs, which suggests that prevailing levels of sharing 
are always efficient.  Although their models highlight the costs of sharing, they do not address how 
these costs might change.  In fact, after calibrating their model using current CES data, Salcedo et al. 
argue that income growth explains 37 percent of the decline in the number of adults (and 16 
percent of the decline in the number of children) in the average household  from 1850 until 2000 
(Salcedo et al. 2013, 153).  Their claim rests on the heroic assumption that the amount of time it 
took to form and maintain relationships with housemates remained constant for one hundred and 
fifty years, while the opportunity cost of that time increased with wages.  However, it seems likely 
that the costs (and benefits) of sharing changed due to technological innovation and the evolution 
of norms and preferences.  For example, the norms that defined the rights and responsibilities 
within multi-generational households may have deteriorated over time.  Also, preferences against 
living with non-relatives may have developed endogenously, as children increasingly grew up in 
single-family households.  In short, it is unclear whether prevailing norms and preferences lead 
individuals to live in households of the optimal size, as the neoclassical theory suggests.  It is 
similarly unclear whether individuals engage in the optimal level of inter-household sharing. 
Not all economists are so optimistic that individuals will easily form clubs, households, or 
other institutions to efficiently share goods.  Ostrom argues that enduring institutions for governing 
common goods are characterized by seven design principles, including clearly defined boundaries, 
established appropriation rules, and collective participation in setting those rules (Ostrom 1990, 
90).  When these design principles are present, she argues that communities can be the best 
institution for allocating common goods; when these principles are absent, community governance 
fails.  Community governance does not provide a solution for allocating shareable goods, because 
these privately-owned items are dispersed and heterogeneous.  It is very costly for a community to 
set and enforce universal rules governing their use.  In decentralized sharing, lenders have greater 
freedom to set appropriate rules for sharing a particular good with a particular person, but they 
also have fewer resources for enforcing cooperative behavior. 
Benkler, a legal scholar, outlines an alternative to Buchanan and Salcedo et al.’s case for 
markets and Ostrom’s case for community governance.  His 2004 article “Sharing Nicely: On 
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Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as Modality of Economic Production,” focuses on 
environments in which loosely-connected individuals successfully share goods in a decentralized 
manner.   
Benkler highlights the system of “slugging” in Northern Virginia, in which drivers pick up 
and drop off riders at established locations free of charge.  By sharing their rides, “slugs” get a free 
commute, and “body snatchers” earn the right to drive in High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes.  
Slugging emerged organically when HOV lanes were created in the 1970s.  Over time, slugs and 
body snatchers have developed norms that reduce the social cost of sharing, including: first come 
first served; no talking (unless everyone wants to talk); no payment; no eating; and the slug line 
does not leave a single woman standing alone at night (Slugging Etiquette). 
Another example of decentralized cooperation is SETI@home, a network of millions of 
personal computers that make up the largest virtual supercomputer in the world (Benkler 2004, 
291).  SETI@home takes large problems related to the search for extraterrestrial life and breaks 
them into small parts that can be solved by personal computers.  Volunteers contribute to this 
project by installing a program on their computers that automatically solves these problems when 
the computer is idle.   
These case studies illustrate how decentralized sharing can increase the utilization of 
private goods – vehicles and computers – at little cost to owners.  Benkler contrasts decentralized 
sharing with Ostrom’s notion of community governance.  He addresses arguments made by Sam 
Bowles and Herb Gintis that the community governance works because it provides people with 
repeat interactions that improve incentives to cooperate, background knowledge about other 
participants, and rules for enforcing cooperative behavior. 
 
“’Community governance’… gains robustness because it involves tightly connected 
social groups.  But social sharing is a broader phenomenon, one that includes 
cooperative enterprises that can be pursued by weakly connected participants or 
even by total strangers and yet function as a sustainable and substantial modality of 
economic production.  Indeed, in the context of the digitally networked 
environment, it is this type of sharing and cooperative production among strangers 
and weakly connected participants that holds the greatest economic promise” 
(Benkler 2004, 333-4). 
 
Benkler stresses the “fluidity” of participation in slugging and SETI@home.  These institutions 
require a lower level of commitment than community governance.  Benkler acknowledges that 
these forms of cooperation may be less attractive to “communitarians”, who prefer the forms of 
cooperation found in traditional Amish communities or communes.  But he contends that this 
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fluidity makes these decentralized institutions attractive to “many more people” so that they are 
“likely to be more economically effective and efficient on a larger scale” (Benkler 2004, 343).   
 Benkler’s argument draws heavily on the transaction cost literature spurred by Ronald 
Coase.  There are costs to both market and non-market sharing.  Just as it can be less costly to settle 
disputes using informal norms rather than formal laws (Ellickson 1986, 686), it can be less costly 
share goods on reciprocal networks rather than peer-to-peer markets (Benkler 2004, 311).  
Introducing rental fees for shareable goods may reduce sharing.  Bruno Frey and Reto Jegen find 
strong evidence that monetary incentives can crowd-out intrinsic motivation to cooperate (Frey 
and Jegen 2001, 606).  Benkler argues that “social norms may shift around entitlements” to lower 
the transaction costs of non-market sharing (Benkler 2004, 311), but it is unclear how much and 
how quickly norms can shift. 
 Benkler overlooks how George Akerlof’s analysis in “The Market for Lemons” relates to 
cooperation among loosely-connected individuals (Akerlof 1970).  Asymmetric information about 
members of sharing networks may lead to problems of adverse selection.  Online platforms may 
attract uncooperative individuals, who show up late or treat others’ goods carelessly.  This could 
lead cooperative individuals to lend lower-value goods or simply leave the network.  Akerlof’s 
insight also provides an argument for why networks may have tipping points.  If a network can 
attract enough cooperative users that the problem of uncooperative members becomes 
insignificant, then even more cooperative individuals may join the network.  This process may have 
worked in reverse in the case of hitchhiking.  When hitchhiking was widespread, the threat of 
interacting with dangerous riders or drivers was very low.  However, as participation declined and 
the problems of adverse selection increased, hitchhiking may have surpassed a tipping point, 
leading to its collapse in the United States.   
 Scholarly research suggests that sharing goods is either trivial or revolutionary.  In this 
paper I argue that it lies somewhere in between.  Next, I present a theoretical framework for 
understanding the costs and benefits of sharing gods, followed by an empirical analysis of current 
and potential gains from peer-to-peer borrowing and lending 
 
3. Theory 
Within my framework, the economic benefits of sharing stem from the underutilization of shareable 
goods, while the costs of sharing are largely social in nature.  I stress that the costs and benefits of 
sharing depend on norms and preferences.  Current levels of sharing may not be efficient if sticky 
norms and endogenous preferences prevent people from exploiting new technologies.  There are 
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many institutions for increasing the lifetime utilization of shareable goods, but my analysis suggests 
that the greatest gains from sharing will come from decentralized borrowing and lending on online 
platforms.  My framework suggests that the potential value of peer-to-peer sharing could be 
economically significant, a proposition I test with my empirical work. 
 
3.1. The economic benefits of sharing 
By definition, shareable goods are underutilized.  Fully-utilized goods are rival and, hence, private 
goods.  The utilization of goods varies greatly, even for very similar goods.  Recall Buchanan’s 
example.  Formal shoes are quite shareable, because people wear them only on special occasions.  
Casual shoes are not very shareable, because people tend to wear them every day. 
 The gains from sharing a good depend not on its utilization over any particular time period, 
but over its entire lifetime.  Some rarely-used goods are fully depreciated by the time they are 
discarded.  We brush our teeth for a few minutes a day, so we could, in principle, share 
toothbrushes (Frank 2010, 576).  However, we generally use toothbrushes until they are worn out, 
so toothbrushes are not actually underutilized, and there are generally no gains from sharing them 
(even if we wanted to). 
There is little accurate data on the utilization rates of various goods, but existing data 
suggests that the utilization of many goods is quite low.  The average power drill is used between 
six and twenty minutes ever (Steffen 2007).  Assuming that these drills could operate for many 
hours, the relevant utilization rate of privately-owned drills may be less than one percent.  The 
utilization rates of more expensive goods can also be surprisingly low.  Average vehicle occupancy 
in the United States is 1.7 (Santos et al. 2011, 33), which means the utilization rate is about 33 
percent when private vehicles are in use.1  Moreover, private vehicles are driven a bit less than one 
hour a day, or 4 percent of the time (Santos et al. 2011, 7, 31).  Vehicles would depreciate more 
rapidly if they were driven more often, but doubling a vehicle’s annual mileage does not double its 
rate of depreciation.  The effective lifetime utilization rate of the average privately-owned vehicle 
may be 25 percent. 
The low utilization rates of many shareable goods suggest there are substantial economic 
gains from sharing.  Economists recognize the waste of underutilizing stocks of capital and labor, as 
measured by capacity utilization and unemployment rates.  The underutilization of the stock of 
shareable goods represents a similar form of waste.  Whether or not it is efficient for people to 
rarely use many of the goods they own depends on the costs of sharing. 
                                                                
1 Assuming five-seat cars 
9 
 
 
3.2. The costs of sharing 
Both Buchanan and Salcedo et al. explicitly recognize the cost of sharing underutilized goods.  Some 
of the costs of sharing are transaction costs: the time it takes to locate a good, arrange to borrow it, 
pick it up, and drop it off.  However, the costs of sharing transcend transaction costs and are largely 
social in nature.  They depend on the level of trust between the borrower and lender, the ability to 
punish or discourage malfeasance, the clarity of social scripts around sharing, and the value people 
place on privacy, flexibility and independence.  Norms and preferences are important determinants 
of the cost of sharing. 
 The key contribution of Buchanan and Salcedo et al. to the economics of sharing is that they 
model both the benefits and the costs.  The main shortcoming is that they assume that the costs of 
sharing are fixed.  The internet has substantially reduced the transaction costs associated with 
locating a shareable good, but people have not instantaneously joined online platforms to share 
goods.  If norms are sticky, it will take time for people develop etiquette for peer-to-peer sharing.  If 
preferences are endogenous, it will take time for people to learn to like sharing on decentralized 
networks.  I argue that sharing is more complex than simple neoclassical models suggest.  My 
framework suggests the internet may still lead to fundamental changes in norms and preferences 
that sharply reduce the costs of sharing over time.  
On the other hand, even if norms and preferences shift over time to facilitate greater 
sharing, the gains from sharing are limited.  The costs will always outweigh the benefits of sharing 
some underutilized goods.  Even if the utilization rate of privately-owned drills is 1 percent, it may 
be inefficient for one hundred people to share a single drill.  However, that does not mean that it is 
currently efficient for most households to own a private drill that they use for just a few minutes.  In 
wealthy countries, people own many items that they use very rarely.  A simplistic neoclassical 
perspective suggests this must be efficient – why else would they do it?  My framework suggests 
that this large stock of shareable goods provides an opportunity for people to develop norms and 
preferences that will allow them to exploit untapped gains from sharing. 
 
3.3. Institutions for sharing 
Online platforms are just some of the many institutions people use to exploit gains from sharing.  I 
classify these institutions along three dimensions: 
 Institutions for transferring ownership and institutions for lending and borrowing  
 Institutions for centralized sharing and institutions for decentralized sharing 
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 Institutions for market sharing and institutions for non-market sharing 
Common forms of sharing can be organized in a 2∗2∗2 matrix.  Table 2 provides examples of all 
eight types of institutions, with those that facilitate decentralized borrowing and lending in bold.  
My analysis of the costs and benefits of sharing provides some insight for why people tend to 
choose different institutions for sharing different goods in different contexts.  The framework also 
explains why the greatest untapped gains from sharing are likely in decentralized borrowing and 
lending. 
 
Table 2. Methods of Sharing 
 Transferring ownership  Borrowing and lending 
 Centralized Decentralized  Centralized Decentralized 
      
Market thrift stores, 
pawn shops 
high-end garage 
sales, Craigslist, 
EBay, Amazon 
 Tool rental 
stores Zipcar, 
Netflix, 
renttherunway 
RelayRides, 
Airbnb, 
Blablacar 
      
Non-
market 
free stores, 
clothing 
swaps, 
homemade 
stuff swaps? 
low-end garage 
sales, passing on 
clothing, 
Freecycle, 
“borrowing” a 
cup of sugar 
 public 
libraries, 
households, 
communes 
sharing with 
friends and 
neighbors, 
slugging, 
SETI@home, 
Couchsurfing, 
NeighborGoods 
 
People transfer ownership over some goods while they borrow and lend others.  We avoid 
borrowing and lending goods when it is prohibitively costly to haul the good back and forth.  In 
general, bulky and frequently-used goods, including furniture and clothing, tend to be sold or gifted, 
whereas portable and rarely-used items, such as books and drills, tend to be borrowed.  In settings 
with limited trust, it may be preferable for people to transfer full ownership (and residual 
claimancy) of fragile goods to their new owners, rather than borrow and lend them.  The internet 
has especially reduced the transaction cost of borrowing and lending goods, which require many 
more transactions than transferring ownership.  Online platforms also provide new, if imperfect, 
mechanisms for building trust among loosely-connected individuals. 
Some sharing is centralized, while some sharing is decentralized.  Centralized sharing has 
the advantage of reducing some of the costs of finding a particular good.  Institutions that lend out 
goods also have clear rules that ensure borrowers return items in good condition and protect the 
institution from liability.  However, there are distinct advantages to decentralized sharing.  When 
sharing is decentralized, people may not have to travel as far to borrow a good – it is usually 
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preferable to borrow a ladder from a neighbor than a rental store.  By increasing the utilization of 
privately-owned goods, decentralized sharing avoids the cost of storing shareable goods.  I focus on 
decentralized sharing, because new technology particularly facilitates peer-to-peer transactions by 
centralizing information about where goods can be found. 
 Finally, people share some goods through the market, while they share others at no cost.  It 
is not entirely clear why people often avoid sharing goods on markets.  In some cases, the market-
clearing price or rental rate may be close to zero (Thomas 2003).  In others, the cost of setting 
rental rates and prices may lead people to share goods for free.  Exchanging money may crowd-out 
intrinsic motivations to share goods (Willer et al. 2012).  Lending goods for free may also 
encourage borrowers to treat goods more carefully than they would a rented good, increasing the 
total gains from sharing.  However, rental fees may be key to getting people to borrow and lend 
valuable goods.  This paper’s focus on decentralized borrowing and lending includes both market 
and non-market sharing. 
The internet has improved many established institutions for sharing, including libraries, car 
rental companies, and second-hand markets.  But the internet particularly opens up opportunities 
for decentralized borrowing and lending.  The cost of coordinating convenient, reliable, safe, peer-
to-peer transactions is declining.  The question is whether these new institutions promote norms 
and preferences that are conducive to borrowing and lending goods on online platforms. 
 
3.4. The sharing economy 
A recent surge in websites aim to facilitate decentralized borrowing and lending.  Couchsurfing 
matches guests with hosts.  NeighborGoods lets people share underutilized tools, media, and gear.  
RelayRides facilitates peer-to-peer car rental.  The mixed success of these sites provides some 
support to Benkler’s 2004 claim that sharing will become increasingly important in the “digitally 
networked” economy.  It remains to be seen to what extent these platforms can shift norms and 
preferences to radically increase sharing. 
Not all companies associated with the sharing economy aim to increase the utilization of 
shareable goods.  For example, Lyft provides an unregulated taxi service and TaskRabbit an 
informal labor market.  It is also worth noting that, although there are both market and non-market 
platforms for sharing goods, there are few non-market sites for people to share services without 
receiving anything in exchange.  A survey of users of the Finnish sharing platform, Kassi, found that 
people were much more eager to share their stuff than share their time (Suhonen et al. 2010, 9).  
This may be because people’s time is generally more rival than their shareable goods. 
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The goal of sharing platforms like CouchSurfing, NeighborGoods, and RelayRides is to 
facilitate better matches between borrowers and lenders than offline networks of friends, 
neighbors, and relatives.  They aim to get users exactly what they need, precisely when they need it, 
as conveniently as possible.  Online sharing platforms facilitate borrowing and lending in three 
ways: they organize information about what goods members would like to share, they provide 
feedback mechanisms that encourage cooperative behavior, and they strengthen preferences for 
sharing.  Organizing information for decentralized borrowing and lending is useful even for sharing 
among friends, relatives, and neighbors, since it is prohibitively costly to continually inform 
acquaintances of all items one would like to borrow or lend.  Allowing people to leave feedback on 
the actions of others, and strengthening preferences for borrowing and lending goods, are essential 
for decentralized sharing among loosely-connected individuals. 
Consider how NeighborGoods and Couchsurfing encourage people to share durable goods 
and lodging with strangers.  Members of NeighborGoods post items they would like to share to their 
inventories and search the local inventories for items they would like to borrow.  When members 
cannot find an item they would like to borrow, they can post it to their wishlist.  If someone 
requests to borrow a certain good, and the lender agrees, NeighborGoods asks the borrower to 
provide his or her telephone number, describe how he or she would like to use the good, and agree 
to follow the “three golden rules of sharing: play nice, treat other people’s stuff the way you’d want 
your stuff to be treated, and show up on time.”  The pair then arranges for the borrower to pick up 
and drop off the good at a convenient time and place.  When the transaction is complete, 
NeighborGoods asks the lender to rate and comment on the borrower, and the borrower to rate and 
comment on both the lender and the item.  In cases of malicious behavior, members can place a 
“panic” on alleged offenders, and NeighborGoods retains the right to permanently remove bad 
actors from its site.  (Of course, the site has no way of preventing offenders from setting up another 
account under a different username). 
Couchsurfing similarly organizes information and enforces cooperation to facilitate sharing.  
In their 2009 paper, “Surfing a Web of Trust”, Lauterbach, Truong, Shah, and Adamic analyze 
anonymous, individual-level data from Couchsurfing.  General reciprocity is vital to Couchsurfing, 
since direct reciprocity is only possible if two members travel to each other’s home cities – an 
unlikely coincidence of wants.  However, Lauterbach et al. find that 12 to 18 percent of 
Couchsurfing stays were directly reciprocated between 2004 and 2008, suggesting that 
Couchsurfing experiences can lead to new friendships (Lauterbach et al. 2009, 348).   
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These online sharing platforms recognize that the costs and benefits of sharing depend 
critically on sticky norms and endogenous preferences.  They promote norms that are conducive to 
sharing among loosely-connected individuals, such as NeighborGoods’ three golden rules 
encouraging borrowers to be friendly, careful, and punctual.  They also encourage people to 
recognize the endogeneity of preferences.  Couchsurfing tells new users, “You have friends all over 
the world, you just haven’t met them yet” (Couchsurfing, How It Works).  Friendship is, in a sense, 
the ultimate endogenous preference.  Online sharing platforms have not maximized the benefits or 
minimized the costs of decentralized sharing, but the plethora of sites ensures steady 
experimentation as platforms compete for users.  This competition is not entirely zero-sum.  
Promoting cooperative norms and sharing preferences benefits all platforms in the sharing 
economy. 
 My framework suggests that the internet may not only reduce the transaction costs of 
borrowing and lending, but also shift norms and preferences to substantially increase decentralized 
sharing.  Like Benkler, I am optimistic about the prospect of substantially greater sharing in the 
digital economy.  However, theory alone cannot address how economically important decentralized 
borrowing and lending is today or will be in the future. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
This paper seeks to answer two key empirical questions:  How large are the current gains from 
decentralized sharing?  And what are the potential gains from peer-to-peer sharing on online 
platforms?  Data on sharing are limited, leading Benkler to refer to it as the “dark matter of the 
economic production universe” (Benkler 2004, 337).  I draw on four sources: the General Social 
Survey (GSS), the NeighborGoods network, my own survey, and the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CES).  All these data have significant limitations.  None offers good measures of the social costs (or 
benefits) of sharing, so my empirical work focuses on the economic benefits of sharing. 
The GSS provides self-reported data on sharing with people in other households.  The 
survey’s 2002 and 2004 topical modules on altruism ask respondents how often they performed 
nine altruistic acts, including how often they “let someone [they] didn’t know very well borrow an 
item of some value like dishes.”  I pool data from the 2002 and 2004 surveys for a sample of 2,712 
people, and I convert the categorical values like “once a month” and “two or three times a year” to 
annual values following Einolf (2007).  Unfortunately, the GSS only asks people how often they 
share items with someone they don’t know very well, whereas most decentralized borrowing and 
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lending occurs largely within reciprocal networks of friends, neighbors, and relatives.  The GSS 
question misses these transactions. 
To address this shortcoming of the GSS question, I designed and conducted my own online 
survey of NeighborGoods users.  My survey consists of eighteen questions and takes about ten 
minutes to complete.  Respondents had a one-in-fifty chance of winning a $100 Amazon gift card “to 
purchase something you (and your neighbors) need”.  I ask how often subjects borrow and lend 
items with people they know well and with people they don’t know well.  The survey asks users 
about their motivations and obstacles to sharing goods online.  I also collect data on individual and 
household characteristics.  The full survey is in Appendix A.  NeighborGoods emailed a link to the 
survey to 22,000 active and inactive members in August 2013, and 333 people completed the 
survey, giving me a response rate of 1.5 percent.  Although this response rate is low, it is common 
for surveys of large online communities.  For example, Willer et al.’s survey of 47,492 Freecycle 
users achieved a response rate of 1.7 percent (Willer et al. 2012, Appendix A). 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of GSS and NeighborGoods samples 
  GSS sample   NeighborGoods sample 
Variable Obs Mean Min Max  
Obs Mean Min Max 
Gender 2,712 0.51 0 1 
 
324 0.45 0 1 
Age 2,700 44.7 18 89 
 
319 41.6 20 81 
Household size 2,712 2.74 1 11 
 
323 2.60 1 5 
Household income 2,398 59,243 449 204,320 
 
306 84,412 10,000 150,000 
Happiness 2,706 2.22 1 3   325 2.22 1 3 
Variables definitions: gender (male = 0, female = 1), household size ("5 or more" = 5 for NG sample), 
household income (based on midpoints, in 2013 dollars), happiness (1 = "not too happy", 2 = "pretty 
happy", 3 = "very happy").  GSS means are weighted, NeighborGoods means are unweighted. 
 
The NeighborGoods sample is quite similar to the GSS sample.  Respondents to my survey 
include slightly more men, are slightly younger, and live in slightly smaller households, as shown in 
Table 3.  Respondents from the two surveys report nearly identical levels of happiness.  The most 
significant discrepancy between the two samples is that my subjects report a mean household 
income that is 42 percent larger than GSS respondents.  My sample comes disproportionately from 
wealthier Pacific states (NeighborGoods was launched in California), but re-weighting the sample to 
reflect the actual regional distribution of the US reduces the income discrepancy by just 1 percent.  
Part of the income difference may result from how I code the category “$100,000 or more”.  Re-
coding the income category $120,000 instead of $150,000 reduces the discrepancy by about a third.  
I am forced to conclude that my sample is more affluent than the American population at large.  I 
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suspect that is because people with higher incomes and higher levels of education use the internet 
more extensively, making them more likely to join NeighborGoods and respond to my online 
survey.  
My survey provides better data on how frequently people borrow and lend goods with 
people they do know well, but it does not ask respondents to report their gains from sharing each 
time they borrow a good.  Instead, I estimate the average gains from sharing when people borrow 
items for free using anonymous data from NeighborGoods.  I use activity logs from March 2009 to 
November 2012 that provide information about 14,937 items and 1,281 transactions over this time 
period.  When users add an item to their inventory, NeighborGoods asks them to list its value.  
Table 4 lists the median and mean value of goods that are posted and goods that are shared.  I 
assume that the items people share on NeighborGoods are similar to the items that people share 
offline.  If anything, the median good shared among their friends, relatives, and neighbors is 
probably worth more than the typical good shared on NeighborGoods. 
 
Table 4. Value of items on NeighborGoods 
  Obs Median value Mean value 
Posted goods 14,863 $60  $214  
Shared goods 1,243 $75  $466  
 
The next step is to translate the value of a good into the value of borrowing that good.  
Economists have lots of data on how much goods cost, but not much data on how much it is worth 
to use a good for an hour, a day, or a week.  Rental markets are very thin for most of the goods that 
people share with one another, so they do not provide a good measure of the value of borrowing a 
good for a day.  My survey provides a measure of the value of borrowing goods.  It asks users if they 
would “consider sharing more expensive items on NeighborGoods if lenders could charge a fee.”  
Many users worry that allowing fees would undermine the cooperative spirit of the network, but 55 
percent of respondents are amenable to the idea.  The survey asks those users to list specific goods 
they would be willing to borrow or lend for a fee, how much the goods are worth, and what rental 
fees they would be willing to pay or accept.  Borrowers and lenders have very similar ideas about 
the value of sharing.  It is worth more to share valuable goods, but the proposed rental/asset price 
ratios decline as the value of the good increases.  The scatter plot in Figure 1 shows the actual 
rental/asset price ratios that respondents would pay as borrowers and accept as lenders.  I use a 
local polynomial estimator to estimate the rental/asset price ratio for goods of any value.  This 
method allows for a non-linear relationship between the variables, and it provides good estimates 
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of the ratios near the endpoints.  My predicted ratios suggest that people are willing to pay 9.4 
percent of the asset price to borrow an item worth $50, 5.8 percent to borrow an item worth $500, 
and 1.9 percent to borrow an item worth $5,000.  Lenders are willing to loan goods at very similar 
rates, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
  
 Rental companies often lend goods at significantly higher rental rates, which is one reason 
why rental markets for most shareable goods are quite small.  For example, bike shops typically 
rent $300 to $500 bicycles for $30 to $50 a day (Citibike Resources), so the rental/asset price ratio 
is about 10 percent, almost twice the 5.8 to 6.4 percent that most people are willing to pay to 
borrow a good of that value.  The gap between the ratio rental companies charge and the ratio most 
individuals are willing to pay and accept represents the gains from decentralized borrowing and 
lending.2  I use the predicted rental/asset price ratios from the polynomial regression to assign a 
                                                                
2 Many cities have recently implemented bike-sharing programs that are transforming the bicycle rental market.  For 
example, the New York City bike share program now offers access to 6,000 bikes at hundreds of stations in Manhattan 
and Brooklyn.  Citibike does not compete directly with shops on daily rentals.  It is focused instead on providing shorter 
term bike rentals to facilitate commutes.  For $95 a year, members borrow a bike for an unlimited number of 45 minute 
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Figure 1: Actual and predicted rental/asset price ratios
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value to goods actually shared on NeighborGoods.  I estimate that the mean benefit of a good 
borrowed on NeighborGoods in my sample is $14.88.  I use this estimate to assign a monetary value 
to self-reported peer-to-peer sharing in both the GSS and my own survey.  My results are discussed 
in the following section. 
 The last task of my paper is to estimate the potential value of decentralized sharing.  Most 
online platforms have achieved limited success so far in facilitating sharing among loosely-
connected individuals.  It is not yet clear how many additional transactions these platforms will 
facilitate, or whether they will be more successfully in getting people to share cheap or expensive 
goods.  This makes it impossible to estimate the potential value of decentralized sharing in the same 
way I estimate the current value. 
 Instead, I use the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) to calculate how much households 
spend on different categories of shareable goods.  I measure expenditures on shareable goods in the 
same way Salcedo et al. measure expenditures on household public goods.  I first determine which 
Universal Classification Codes (UCCs) represent spending on the sort of goods that are most 
commonly shared on general sharing platforms, such as tools, media, gear, electronics, and toys.  
This leaves out items which are occasionally shared on general platforms, and more often shared on 
specialized platforms, such as vacation homes, lodging, private vehicles, and pets.  My classification 
of 490 UCCs into six categories of shareable goods is listed in Appendix B. 
Current spending on shareable goods provides an imperfect upper-bound for the potential 
value of sharing.  First, the measure ignores any social costs or benefits from sharing.  Even if 
decentralized sharing becomes routine, households cannot eliminate their expenditures on 
shareable goods, because sharing is limited by the utilization of shareable goods.  On the other 
hand, not all gains from sharing will come from people borrowing items they would otherwise have 
purchased; some gains will come from people borrowing items they would have foregone.  
Nevertheless, household expenditures on shareable goods provide a useful upper-bound on the 
potential gains from sharing, especially for advocates who suggest that the gains from sharing are 
very large.  The CES also provides some information about which categories of goods promise the 
greatest gains from sharing. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
trips.  However, if the length of the trip exceeds 45 minutes, the program charges members $2.50 for the next 30 minutes, 
and $9.00 for each additional 30 minutes.  The daily rental/asset price ratio for Citibike would be much higher than that 
offered by bike shops or decentralized lenders.  However, for short-term rentals, the ratio is much lower. 
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5. Results 
Self-reported data from the GSS and my survey suggest that the current gains from sharing are at 
least $179 a year for 30 percent of Americans and at least $774 for 8 percent of Americans.  Data 
from the CES shows households spend an average of $9,090 a year on shareable goods, which 
suggests that the potential savings from greater decentralized sharing are limited but significant.  
By far, the largest gains from sharing would probably come from greater utilization of privately-
owned vehicles. 
5.1. The current value of decentralized sharing 
According to the GSS, 7 percent of Americans report lending an item of some value to someone they 
“didn’t know very well” once a month or more.  By comparison, 8 percent of my survey respondents 
report lending items to people they didn’t know well once a month or more.  This, along with the 
evidence presented in Table 3, suggests that my sample of NeighborGoods users is fairly 
representative of the US population at large, at least in respect to how often they share goods.  
Respondents to my survey report sharing with people they know well about five times as often as 
they report sharing with people they did not know well.  Table 5 shows that 35 percent report 
lending items to people they know well, and 29 percent report borrowing items from people they 
know well, at least once a month. 
 
Table 5. Frequency of sharing 
 
GSS sample 
 
NeighborGoods Sample 
 
lend to 
someone you 
didn't know 
well 
 
lend to 
someone you 
didn't know 
well 
lend to 
someone you 
knew well 
borrow from 
someone you 
didn't know 
well 
borrow from 
someone you 
knew well 
More than once a week 29 1% 
 
2 1% 18 5% 1 0% 8 2% 
Once a week 39 1% 
 
6 2% 27 8% 3 1% 16 5% 
Once a month 128 5% 
 
15 5% 71 22% 14 4% 71 22% 
At least 2 to 3 times in 
the past year 
474 18% 
 
41 12% 109 33% 29 9% 90 28% 
Once in the past year 464 17% 
 
66 20% 30 9% 60 19% 52 16% 
Not at all in the past year 1553 58% 
 
199 60% 74 22% 217 67% 89 27% 
Total 2687 100% 
 
329 100% 329 100% 324 100% 326 100% 
 
Self-reported data is imperfect.  First, the wording of the questions probably misses 
occasions when people share some valuable goods, such as car trips or lodging.  Second, the 
question asks how often individuals borrow and lend goods, so it misses borrowing and lending by 
other members of the individuals’ household.  Third, people report lending items slightly more 
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often than borrowing items.  While it is possible that respondents to my survey genuinely lend 
goods more often than they borrow them, it seems likely that they mildly exaggerate how often they 
lend goods or how seldom they borrow goods.3  These three shortcomings of the data may 
downwardly bias my estimates of households’ gains from sharing. 
My survey suggests that current levels of peer-to-peer sharing are economically significant 
for some Americans.  If the average gain from sharing is $14.88, then borrowing goods is worth at 
least $179 annually to 30 percent of people, and it is worth at least $774 annually to 8 percent of 
people.  On average, respondents report borrowing 9.5 items a year and lending 14.3 items a year, 
which imply mean gains from sharing are $141 and $213 respectively.  My estimates suggest that 
sharing goods is an important component of non-market cooperation.  Compare the value of 
borrowing and lending goods to the value of time spent helping non-household children, helping 
non-household adults, and volunteering.  The American Time Use Survey reports how much time 
people spend on each of these activities.  I then value these forms of non-market work at $10 per 
hour, which is somewhat higher than Nancy Folbre’s lower-bound valuation of childcare time 
(Folbre 2008, 121-135) and consistent with Woods Bowman’s analysis of the value of volunteer 
time (Bowman 2009).  Table 6 compares the value of sharing goods with the value of helping non-
household members and formal volunteering.  Gains from sharing are not quite as important as the 
time people spend helping each other outside the market, but they are an important form of 
cooperation. 
 
Table 6.  The value of sharing goods, helping non-household members,  
and formal volunteering 
 
 mean incidents 
per year 
mean minutes 
per day annual value* 
borrowing goods 9.5 
 
$141 
lending goods 14.3 
 
$213 
helping non-hh kids 
 
4.5 $272 
helping non-hh adults 
 
5.2 $316 
formal volunteering 
 
9.7 $588 
*I assume that the mean value of sharing a good is $14.88 and that non-market work 
is worth $10 an hour. 
Source: My survey and ATUS 2003-2012 sample means using person/day weights 
 
                                                                
3 The data does suggest that decentralized sharing is fairly reciprocal.  The correlation between annualized measures 
estimates of lending to anyone and borrowing from anyone is 0.58. 
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The internet currently facilitates a very small fraction of decentralized borrowing and 
lending.  Among my survey respondents, all of whom are members of NeighborGoods, less than one 
percent of sharing occurs on that network.  However, my survey results suggest that online 
platforms have potential.  I ask users, “What are your main reasons for not borrowing more items 
on NeighborGoods?”  Only 12 percent of respondents responded that one obstacle is, “I am 
uncomfortable borrowing items from people I don’t know.”  By contrast, 66 percent of users say, “I 
forget to check NeighborGoods’ inventory when I need something.”  It may take time and practice 
for people’s norms and preferences to adapt to new online methods for sharing.  My survey also 
finds that 72 percent of respondents think, “There are not enough NeighborGoods users in my 
area.”  This suggests that a fundamental challenge for online platforms is to build a critical mass of 
users in order to match borrowers with lenders as well as offline networks. 
I conclude that the current value of peer-to-peer sharing is economically significant, but 
moderate, for some Americans.  Specifically, I estimate that it is worth at least $179 annually to 30 
percent of Americans and at least $774 annually to 8 percent of Americans.  Although 
NeighborGoods facilitates a small percentage of transaction among my survey respondents, online 
platforms may be more successful as they mold norms and preferences and attract a critical mass of 
users in local areas. 
 
5.1.  The potential value of decentralized sharing 
The next task for this paper is to estimate the potential gains from sharing, if platforms are able to 
facilitate high levels of sharing between strangers.  I do this by calculating households’ expenditures 
on different categories of shareable goods.  As noted in Section 4, this does not provide an exact 
estimate of the potential gains from sharing, but it does provide an upper bound on the amount of 
money households could save from borrowing, rather than purchasing, different types of shareable 
goods.  The exercise also sheds some light on what categories of goods may offer the largest gains 
from sharing.  
 The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) reports that households spend an average of $820 
a year on tools, media, gear, electronics, toys and other goods that are typical of the items shared on 
platforms like NeighborGoods, Sharetribe, and Acts of Sharing.  If these goods are highly 
underutilized, and if the social costs of sharing are zero, then households could save no more than 
$820 a year by borrowing these goods instead of purchasing them.  It is unclear what the gains of 
sharing are given actual utilization rates and social costs.  It may nevertheless be helpful for 
proponents and designers of platforms to recognize that households spend a limited amount of 
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money on the tools, media, gear, electronics, and toys that often clutter our homes.  The largest 
gains from sharing may lie elsewhere. 
 Members of NeighborGoods, Sharetribe, and Acts of Sharing occasionally borrow and lend 
other types of goods, including pets, vacation homes, lodging, and private vehicles.  Table 7 lists 
households’ mean annual expenditure on each category of these goods, as well as platforms 
designed specifically for sharing these goods.  On average, households spend $9,090 each year on 
all types of shareable goods.  It is unclear exactly how this upper bound translates into potential 
gains from sharing.  However, it seems reasonable to conclude that, if decentralized borrowing and 
lending becomes common, the average households’ gains from sharing could exceed one thousand 
dollars annually. 
 
Table 7. Household expenditures on shareable goods 
Categories of spending 
Mean annual 
expenditures Sharing networks Peer-to-peer markets 
Tools, media, gear, etc. $820 
NeighborGoods, Acts of 
Sharing, Sharetribe 
Snapgoods 
Pets $286 Spotwag NA 
Vacation homes $289 HomeExchange Airbnb 
Lodging away from home $298 CouchSurfing Airbnb 
Private vehicles (fixed costs) $3,994 Sharetribe, Acts of 
Sharing 
Carpooling.com, 
Wheelz, RelayRides,  
Zimride,  Private vehicles (variable costs) $3,403 
All shareable goods $9,090 
  Source: Consumer Expenditure Public Use Microdata 2011 using household weights. 
 
Pets offer a particularly striking example of the potential gains from sharing.  The cover of 
The Economist’s 2013 issue depicts a “sharing economy” household renting its lawnmower for $6 a 
day, its surfboard for $80 a week, and its dog for $5 a walk.  The dog stands out as the only good for 
which it seems just as plausible for the “borrower” to charge the “lender” as vice versa.  Many pet 
owners would like help looking after their pets, especially when they are out of town.  Meanwhile, 
many people who do not own pets would like some animal company without the full-time 
responsibility of being a pet owner.  There are clearly gains from sharing pets, even if is unclear 
who should pay whom.  Spotwag’s solution to this problem is to set the price at zero, providing pet 
owners with free pet sitters, and non-owners with free pet rentals. 
Table 7 shows that, by far, the largest potential gains from sharing are in transportation.  
Households spend an average of $7,397 a year on the fixed and variable costs associated with 
private vehicles.  While car rental companies and taxi services provide centralized means for 
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sharing vehicles, annual household expenditures on car rentals and taxis are just $31 and $28 
respectively.  A slew of companies are attempting to facilitate greater peer-to-peer sharing.  Zimride 
and Carpooling.com promote ride-sharing, by matching drivers and riders, providing feedback 
mechanisms, and helping drivers charge riders a clear fee.  RelayRides and Wheelz use similar tools 
to create an online marketplace for peer-to-peer car rentals.  It is not yet clear how successful these 
companies will be, but some households could probably save over a thousand dollars a year by 
actively sharing vehicles with peers.  In this case, there are external benefits too: ridesharing and 
carsharing reduce demand for parking; ridesharing also reduces pollution and congestion (Gorenflo 
& Eskandari-Qajar 2013). 
 The average US household spends $9,090 a year on shareable goods that some people 
already borrow and lend using online platforms.  This figure provides an upper bound on the 
potential savings from decentralized sharing, and it leads me to conclude that peer-to-peer sharing 
could provide over one thousand dollars in value for the typical American household.  The 
economic gains from sharing are not limitless, as some proponents suggest, but they are significant 
– particularly in the context of stagnating incomes. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Economic theory recognizes both the costs and the benefits of sharing.  However, these costs and 
benefits are not set in stone.  They depend not only on technology, but also on norms and 
preferences that are susceptible to change.  This leads me to reject the notion that current levels of 
sharing are necessarily efficient and argue that decentralized borrowing and lending could become 
much more important in the digital economy.  From this perspective, I estimate the current and 
potential value of peer-to-peer sharing.  If online sharing platforms are successful, that suggests 
that the average household’s gains from sharing could exceed a thousand dollars annually.  The 
largest gains arise from greater utilization of the massive fleet of privately-owned vehicles in the 
US. 
The sharing economy is fertile ground for future economic research.  One goal would be to 
improve upon my estimates of the value of decentralized sharing.  More detailed surveys might ask 
subjects to list the items they share with family, friends, and neighbors.  They may also place a value 
on carpooling and hosting guests.  Qualitative research may also shed greater light on the social 
costs and benefits of sharing goods. 
Other research might address why some people share more than others.  There is some 
evidence that people with lower market incomes engage in greater non-market cooperation. It is 
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not yet clear whether poor people borrow and lend goods more often than their affluent peers.  
However, further research on who shares may shed light on how sharing acts as a complement and 
a substitute to market provisioning. 
Researchers would also benefit from a deeper understanding of the returns to scale on a 
variety of sharing platforms.  My survey reveals a widespread belief that that the greatest challenge 
facing some platforms is building a critical mass of users.  While there are many reasons to expect 
significant returns to scale on these platforms, there is no data that shows this to be the case.  
Economists should estimate matching functions for sharing platforms similar to those they estimate 
for labor markets.  These matching functions will vary greatly across platforms.  For example, 
Couchsurfing helps people find hosts around the world, whereas NeighborGoods helps people find 
durable goods around the block.  Describing these returns to scale may give designers of platforms 
a better idea of how to build a successful platform. 
Future research might also address the possible environmental benefits of online platforms.  
My survey indicates that “reducing waste” is the most common motivation for participating on 
NeighborGoods.  The internet has produced a number of institutions for sharing goods, including 
Craigslist, eBay, and Freecycle.  National data from the EPA shows that per-capita municipal solid 
waste (MSW) grew steadily until 2000, when it peaked at 4.7 pounds per person per day, and then 
began a slow decline.  Careful analysis might reveal whether new institutions for sharing goods 
played a role in this reduction in waste and, if so, how to build on that success it in the future.  
Finally, the sharing economy opens up new opportunities to test hypotheses from 
behavioral economics in non-experimental settings.  Big data could allow researchers to address a 
number of fundamental questions.  How do people cooperate?  Do they reward individuals who 
cooperate by sharing nicely?  Do they punish bad actors?  Do they reciprocate directly or indirectly 
after borrowing a good?  The growth of sharing platforms may not only improve households’ 
standard of living and reduce waste, but also provide new opportunities for researchers to observe 
a wide range of economic interactions. 
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Appendix B 
UCC UCC description Category of shareable good 
Percent 
of total 
expen-
ditures 
470111 Gasoline Private vehicles (variable costs) 6.675 
500110 Vehicle insurance Private vehicles (fixed costs) 2.432 
450210 New trucks or vans (net outlay) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 1.952 
460110 Used cars (net outlay) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 1.795 
460901 Used trucks or vans (net outlay) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 1.759 
450110 New cars (net outlay) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 1.747 
210210 
Lodging away from home away from home on 
trips 
Lodging away from home 0.833 
480110 
Tires (new, used or recapped); replacement and 
mounting of tires, including tube replacement 
Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.402 
610320 Pets, pet supplies and medicine for Pets Pets 0.398 
220212 
Same as 220211 - owned vacation home, vacation 
coops 
Vacation homes 0.357 
470113 Gasoline on out-of-town trips Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.350 
610110 
Toys, games, arts, crafts, tricycles, and battery 
powered riders 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.331 
510901 Truck or van finance charges Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.315 
520110 Vehicle registration state/local Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.304 
620420 Veterinarian expenses for Pets Pets 0.299 
450310 Basic lease charge (car lease) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.265 
510110 Automobile finance charges Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.265 
220312 
Same as 220311 - owned vacation home; vacation 
coops 
Vacation homes 0.241 
490312 Lubrication and oil changes Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.212 
490413 Motor repair and replacement Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.183 
660110 School books, supplies, and equipment for college Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.177 
490221 Brake work Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.169 
450410 Basic lease charge (truck/van lease) Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.162 
490311 Motor tune-up Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.147 
490318 
Repair tires and miscellaneous repair work, such 
as battery charge, wash, wax, repair and 
replacement of windshield wiper, wiper motor, 
heater, air conditioner, radio and antenna 
Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.142 
590230 Books not through book clubs Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.128 
480213 Vehicle parts, equipment, and accessories Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.125 
470112 Diesel fuel Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.125 
320410 
Lawnmowing equipment and other yard 
machinery 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.124 
590310 Magazine or newspaper subscription Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.117 
670902 
Rentals of books and equipment, and other 
school-related expenses 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.108 
600122 
Trailer-type or other attachable-type camper (net 
outlay) 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.101 
490211 Clutch and transmission repair Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.099 
620410 Pet services Pets 0.097 
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520531 
Parking fees at garages, meters, and lots excl. fees 
that are costs of property ownership 
Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.095 
490412 Electrical system repair Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.084 
230152 Repair and remodeling services (owned vacation) Vacation homes 0.080 
610230 Photographic equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.080 
490110 
Body work, painting, repair and replacement of 
upholstery, vinyl/convertible top, and glass, 
installation of carpet 
Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.075 
310220 Video cassettes, tapes, and discs Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.073 
320521 Small electrical kitchen appliances Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.073 
460902 
Used motorcycles, motor scooters, or mopeds 
(net outlay) 
Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.070 
600420 Hunting and fishing equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.069 
490231 Steering or front end repair Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.063 
450220 
New motorcycles, motor scooters, or mopeds (net 
outlay) 
Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.063 
490232 Cooling system repair Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.061 
520512 Auto rental on out-of-town trips rentalvehicles 0.059 
490313 Front end alignment, wheel balance and rotation Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.054 
600310 Bicycles Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.053 
620912 Rental of video cassettes, tapes, and discs Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.051 
310231 Video game software Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.051 
320420 Power tools Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.044 
320511 Electric floor cleaning equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.044 
310232 Video game hardware/accessories Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.044 
310230 
Video and computer game hardware and 
software 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.043 
260113 
Same as 260112 - owned vacation home; vacation 
condos and coops 
Vacation homes 0.040 
490900 Auto repair service policy Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.039 
230902 
Same as 230901 - owned vacation home; vacation 
condos and coops 
Vacation homes 0.037 
490411 Exhaust system repair Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.036 
310314 Digital audio players Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.036 
590410 Magazine or newspaper, single copy Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.035 
490319 Vehicle air conditioner repair Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.035 
220122 
Same as 220121 - owned vacation home, vacation 
coops 
Vacation homes 0.035 
310340 Records, CDs, audio tapes Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.034 
520410 Vehicle inspection Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.033 
320150 Barbeque grills and outdoor equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.033 
600132 Boat with motor (net outlay) Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.030 
470211 Motor oil Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.029 
310210 VCR''s and video disc players Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.028 
310320 
Sound components, component systems, and 
compact disc sound systems 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.028 
320522 Portable heating and cooling equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.027 
320370 Non-electric cookware Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.027 
520310 Driver?s license Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.025 
480212 Vehicle products and services Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.024 
340901 
Rental or repair of equipment and other yard 
machinery, power and non-power tools 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.023 
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490212 Drive shaft and rear-end repair Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.023 
450313 Cash down payment (car lease) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.021 
520511 Auto rental, excl. trips rentalvehicles 0.020 
430130 
Travel items, including luggage, and luggage 
carriers 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.019 
320320 China and other dinnerware Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.018 
520532 Parking fees on out-of-town trips Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.017 
320130 Infants? equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.017 
600410 Camping equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.017 
600430 Winter sports equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.017 
600121 
Boat without motor or non camper-type trailer, 
such as for boat or cycle (net outlay) 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.016 
600902 Other sports equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.015 
450413 Cash down payment (truck/van lease) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.015 
320902 Non-power tools Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.015 
490314 Shock absorber replacement Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.015 
210902 Ground rent - owned vacation home Vacation homes 0.014 
250213 Gas, bottled or tank - owned vacation home Vacation homes 0.014 
620919 Rental of other vehicles on out-of-town trips Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.013 
470220 
Coolant/antifreeze, brake - transmission fluids, 
additives, and radiator/cooling system protectant 
(not purchased with tune-up) 
Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.013 
520550 Towing charges (excl. contracted or pre-paid) Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.012 
600901 Water sports equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.012 
270413 
Same as 270412 - owned vacation home; vacation 
condos and coops 
Vacation homes 0.012 
520542 Tolls on out-of-town trips Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.012 
270213 
Same as 270212 - owned vacation home; vacation 
condos and coops 
Vacation homes 0.011 
450414 Termination fee (truck/van lease) Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.009 
260213 
Same as 260212 - owned vacation home; vacation 
condos and coops 
Vacation homes 0.009 
590220 Books through book clubs Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.009 
520522 Truck or van rental on out-of-town trips rentalvehicles 0.009 
260114 Electricity - rented vacation property Vacation homes 0.008 
510902 Motorcycle finance charges Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.008 
320310 Plastic dinnerware Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.007 
320340 Glassware Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.007 
320512 Sewing machines Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.007 
310311 Radio Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.007 
480214 Vehicle audio equipment excluding labor Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.006 
520521 Truck or van rental, excl. trips rentalvehicles 0.006 
230142 
Same as 230141 - owned home and vacation 
home 
Vacation homes 0.005 
620904 
Rental and repair of musical instruments, 
supplies, and accessories (now includes pianos) 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.005 
880310 
Interest on line of credit home equity loan - 
owned vacation home 
Vacation homes 0.005 
340907 
Rental and installation of household equipment - 
see 300111-300332 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.005 
520560 Global positioning services Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.005 
320360 Serving pieces other than silver Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.004 
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440140 Clothing rental Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.004 
390902 Girls? other clothing, incl. costumes Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.004 
380903 Women?s other clothing, incl. costumes Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.004 
450314 Termination fee (car lease) Private vehicles (fixed costs) 0.004 
480215 Vehicle video equipment Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.004 
470212 Motor oil on out-of-town trips Private vehicles (variable costs) 0.004 
250113 
Same as 250112 - owned vacation home; vacation 
condos and coops 
Vacation homes 0.003 
420120 Sewing notions, patterns Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.003 
370902 Boys? other clothing, incl. costumes Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.003 
340908 
Rental of office equipment for non-business use - 
see 320232, 690111, 690119, 690120, 690210-
690230 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.003 
230123 
Same as 230122 - owned vacation home; vacation 
condos and coops 
Vacation homes 0.003 
660310 Encyclopedia and other sets of reference books Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.002 
660410 
School books, supplies, and equipment for 
vocational or technical school 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.002 
360902 Men?s other clothing, incl. costumes Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.002 
620905 Rental and repair of photographic equipment Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.002 
520907 
Rental of boat or non camper-type trailer, such as 
for boat or cycle on out-of-town trips 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.002 
310313 Tape recorder and player Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.001 
220314 
Interest on home equity loan - owned vacation 
home 
Vacation homes 0.001 
660901 
School books, supplies, and equipment for day 
care centers and nursery schools 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.001 
600110 Outboard motor Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.001 
340902 Rental of televisions Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.001 
240323 Same as 240322 - owned vacation home Vacation homes 0.001 
240313 Same as 240312 - owned vacation home Vacation homes 0.001 
220902 
Parking at owned vacation home, vacation condos 
and coops 
Vacation homes 0.001 
340905 
Rental of VCR, radio, and sound equipment - see 
310210, 310311-310330 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.001 
320350 Silver serving pieces Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.001 
270414 
Trash and garbage collection - rented vacation 
property 
Vacation homes 0.001 
620918 Rental of video software Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.000 
620917 Rental of video hardware/accessories Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.000 
240113 Same as 240112 - owned vacation home Vacation homes 0.000 
620916 
Rental of video or computer hardware or 
software 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.000 
620906 Rental of all boats and outboard motors Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.000 
520904 
Rental of non camper-type trailer, such as for 
boat or cycle 
Tools, media, gear, etc. 0.000 
320623 Same as 320622 - owned vacation home Vacation homes 0.000 
270903 Septic tank cleaning - owned vacation home Vacation homes 0.000 
240123 Same as 240122 - owned vacation home Vacation homes 0.000 
240223 Same as 240222 - owned vacation home Vacation homes 0.000 
-- 337 UCCs that are not shareable Uncategorized 74.566 
 
